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Involuntary confinement is the most serious deprivation of indi-
vidual liberty that a society may impose. The philosophical justifica-
tions for such a deprivation by means of the criminal process have
been thoroughly explored. No such intellectual effort has been
directed at providing justifications for societal use of civil commitment
procedures.1
When certain acts are forbidden by the criminal law, we are
relatively comfortable in imprisoning those who have engaged in such
acts. We say that the imprisonment of the offender will serve as an
example to others and thus deter them from violating the law. If we
* Our reflections on the justifications for civil commitment were greatly aided and
in part actuated by the excellent collection of material in J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN &
A. DERsHowrrz, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967). See also T. SZASZ,
LAW, LIBER Y AND PSYCHIATRY (1963) ; Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process:
A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL, Feb./Mar. 1968, at 29. The latter article is
particularly perceptive.
f Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1958, Dartmouth
College. LL.B. 1961, Stanford University.
"tAssociate Professor of Psychology and Child Development, University of
Minnesota. B.A. 1952, M.D. 1958, M.S. 1961, University of Minnesota. Psychiatric
Consultant, Hennepin County (Minnesota) District Courts.
i11 Professor of Psychology, College of Liberal Arts; Professor of Clinical Psy-
chology, Department of Psychiatry, Medical School, University of Minnesota. B.A.
1941, Ph.D. 1945, University of Minnesota.
I But see Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57
MICH. L. REv. 945, 954-964 (1959). It will become obvious that we share the point of
view of C. S. Lewis and Francis Allen that confinement is confinement regardless of
the name under which it parades.
To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to lose my liberty;
to undergo all those assaults on my personality which modern psychotherapy
knows how to deliver; to be re-made after some pattern of "normality"
hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I never professed allegiance; to
know that this process will never end until either my captors have succeeded
or I have grown wise enough to cheat them with apparent success-who cares
whether this is called Punishment or not?
Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 REs JDlcATAE 224, 227 (1953).
Measures which subject individuals to the substantial and involuntary depriva-
tion of their liberty contain an inescapable punitive element, and this reality
is not altered by the fact that the motivations that prompt incarceration are
to provide therapy or otherwise contribute to the person's well-being or re-
form. As such, these measures must be closely scrutinized to insure that
power is being applied consistently with those values of the community that
justify interference with liberty for only the most clear and compelling reasons.
F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRnmiNAL JusTicE 37 (1964).
76 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
even stop to consider the morality of depriving one man of his liberty
in order to serve other social ends, we usually are able to allay anxiety
by referring to the need to incarcerate to protect society from further
criminal acts or the need to reform the criminal. When driven to it,
at last, we admit that our willingness to permit such confinement rests
on the notion that the criminal has justified it by his crime. Eligibility
for social tinkering based on guilt, retributive though it may be, has
so far satisfied our moral sensibilities.'
It is, we believe, reasonably clear that the system could not be
justified were the concept of guilt not part of our moral equipment.
Would we be comfortable with a system in which any man could go
to jail if by so doing he would serve an overriding social purpose?
The normal aversion to punishment by example, with its affront to the
principle of equality, suggests that we would not. Conversely, could
we abide a rule that only those men would be punished whose imprison-
ment would further important social ends? Again, the thought of
vastly different treatment for those equally culpable would make us
uneasy.3
Similarly, if we chose to justify incarceration as a means of
isolating a group quite likely to engage in acts dangerous to others,
we would, without the justification of guilt, have difficulty explaining
why other groups, equally or more dangerous in terms of actuarial data,
are left free. By combining background environmental data, we can
identify categories of persons in which we can say that fifty to eighty
per cent will engage in criminal activity within a short period of time.
4
2 See generally H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) ; H. M.
Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
3 Of course, arbitrary punishment would lose its utility if its nature were widely
known, but even if it were useful it would generally be viewed as morally wrong.
See H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 77-80 (1968). Perhaps the
reason that inequality in application can exist in the civil commitment area is that, like
secret, arbitrary punishment, it does not make us conscious of any threat to our own
liberty.
4 See Briggs, Wirt & Johnson, An Application of Prediction Tables to the Study
of Delinquency, 25 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 46 (1961); Craig & Glick, A Manual
of Procedure for Application of the Glueck Prediction Table, in J. KATZ, J. GoiL-
STEIN & A. DERsHowrrz, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 394-99 (1967);
Thompson, A Validation of the Glueck Social Prediction Scale for Proneness to De-
linquency, 43 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 451 (1952). But see S. HATHAWAY & E. MONA-
CHESI, ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR: MMPI PATTERNS OF NORMAL,
DELINQUENT, DROPOUT, AND OTHER OUTCOMES (1963); S. HATHAWAY & E-. MONA-
cHESi, AN ATLAS OF JUVENILE MMPI PROFILES (1961); S. HATHAWAY & E. MONA-
CHESI, ANALYZING AND PREDICTING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY WITH THE MMPI (1951);
Wirt & Briggs, The Efficacy of Ten of the Glueck's Predictors, 50 J. CRiM. L.C. &
P.S. 478 (1960). See generally Briggs & Wirt, Prediction, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY,
RESEARCH AND THEORY 170 (H. Quay ed. 1965).
In addition to the legal, ethical, and social policy issues upon which we focus in
this paper, there is a difficult problem concerning the application of actuarial results
to the disposition of the individual case. In the text we have simply referred to the
betting odds, the "chances per hundred" that behavior of a stated kind will subse-
quently occur, without examining such questions as how such numerical estimates are
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If social protection is a sufficient justification for incarceration, this
group should be confined as are those criminals who are likely to
sin again.'
The same argument applies when rehabilitative considerations are
taken into account. Most, if not all of us could probably benefit from
some understanding psychological rewiring. Even on the assumption
that confinement should be required only in those cases where anti-
social acts may thereby be averted, it is not at all clear that criminals
are the most eligible for such treatment. In addition, most people would
best arrived at, or what should be their precise interpretation when applied to an
individual. To go into the logical, epistemological and mathematical issues involved
therein (e.g., the very technical controversy over the several alleged meanings of the
word "probability") is beyond the scope of this paper. The leading treatment of the
so-called "clinical-statistical" issue in the behavioral sciences is P. MEEHL, CLINICAL
VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTIoN (1954). See also G. KIMBLE & N. GARMEZY, PRIN-
CIPLES OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 589 (3d ed. 1968); B. KLFINMUNTZ, PERSONALITY
MEASUREmENT 344 (1967) ; P. MARKS & W. SEEMAN, THE ACTUARIAL DESCRIPTION
OF ABNORMAL PERSONALITY (1963); RESEARCH IN CLINICAL ASSESSmENT (E. Megar-
gee ed. 1966); W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 128 (1968); N. SUND-
BERG & L. TYLER, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH AND PRAC-
TICE 197-224 (1962) ; Gough, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction in Psychology, in
PSYCHOLOGY IN THE MAKING 526 (L. Postman ed. 1962) ; Kleinmuntz, The Process-
ing of Clinical Information by Man and Machine, in FoRmAL REPRESENTATION OF
HUMAN JUDGMENT 149 (B. Kleinmuntz ed. 1968); Meehl, What Can the Clinician
Do Well? in PROBLEMS IN HuMAN ASSESSMENT 594 (D. Jackson & S. Messick eds.
1967) ; Meehl, When Shall We Use Our Heads Instead of the Formula? 4 J. COUN-
sELING PSYCHOLOGY 268 (1957). Without digressing into the merits of that contro-
versy, we cannot avoid at least entering two caveats for the benefit of our law-trained
readers who will, in general, be unfamiliar with the relevant research literature, by
now very considerable in scope. First, one should not simply assume as somehow
obvious that "individual prediction" is fundamentally different from "actuarial predic-
tion," a quick-and-easy distinction very commonly presupposed in many quarters.
Second, one should not simply assume that "intensive, clinical, psychological under-
standing of the individual" leads generally to more trustworthy forecast of behavior
than a more behavioristic-actuarial approach to the predictive task. This second
assumption seems still to be taken blithely for granted by almost all psychiatrists and-
surprisingly, given the research evidence-by many clinical psychologists. The com-
parative efficacy of different methods of predicting behavior is, of course, a factual
question; and in spite of the armchair plausibility of the above mentioned assumptions
(to be sceptical of "understanding the individual" is rather like being against mother-
hood), there exists a very sizable body of empirical evidence to the contrary. The
latest published summary of factual evidence is Sawyer, Measurement and Prediction,
Clinical and Statistical, 66 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 178 (1966), which also presents a
very sophisticated and fair-minded methodological reformulation. Of some five dozen
published and unpublished research studies known to us, there is only a single study
showing, given an acceptable research design, a clearcut superiority of clinical judg-
ment over actuarial prediction. See Lindzey, Seer Versus Sign, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
RESEARCH iN PERSONALITY 17 (1965) ; Meehl, Seer Over Sign: The First Good Ex-
ample, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 27 (1965). But see Goldberg,
Seer Over Sign: The First "Good" Example? 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH IN
PERSONALITY - (1968). It would be difficult to mention any other domain of social
science research in which the trend of the data is so uniformly in the same direction,
so that any psychiatrist or psychologist who disfavors the objective, actuarial approach
in a practical, decision-making context should be challenged to show his familiarity
with this research literature and invited to rebut the theoretical argument and empirical
evidence found therein.
5The habitual criminal statutes may be thought of as one instance where incar-
ceration is based on a judgment that the person incarcerated is dangerous. But such
statutes also serve a deterrent function by a Benthamite increase in punishment for
those who are viewed as especially likely to commit a crime.
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bridle at the proposition that the state could tamper with their minds
whenever it seemed actuarially sound to do so.
Fortunately, we can by reason of his guilt distinguish the criminal
from others whom we are loathe to confine. He voluntarily flouted
society's commands with an awareness of the consequences. Conse-
quently, he may serve utilitarian purposes without causing his im-
prisoners any moral twinge.
This same sort of analysis is not available once we move beyond
the arena of the criminal law. When people are confined by civil
process, we cannot point to their guilt as a basis for differentiating
them from others. What can we point to?
The common distinguishing factor in civil commitment is aber-
rance. Before we commit a person we demand either that he act or
think differently than we believe he should. Whether our label be
inebriate,6 addict,' psychopath,' delinquent,' or mentally diseased,10 the
core concept is deviation from norms." Our frequently expressed value
'-See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 17-155e (Supp. 1965).
7E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 22, §§ 249-50 (1958); see In re Spadafora, 54 Misc. 2d
123, 281 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
8 E.g., Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 526.09 (1947). See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,
309 U.S. 270 (1940).
)E.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 31B, § 5 (1967) ; see Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506
(4th Cir. 1963); Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d
397 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966).
10 E.g., MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 123, § 1 (1965):
"Mentally ill" person, for the purpose of involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital or school under the provisions of this chapter, shall mean a person
subject to a disease, psychosis, psychoneurosis or character disorder which
renders him so deficient in judgment or emotional control that he is in danger
of causing physical harm to himself or to others, or the wanton destruction
of valuable property, or is likely to conduct himself in a manner which clearly
violates the established laws, or ordinances, conventions or morals of the
community.
11 The concept "abnormal" or "aberrant!' is sorely in need of more thorough
logical analysis than it has, to our knowledge, as yet received. It seems fairly clear
that several components-perhaps even utterly distinct kinds of meaning-can be
discerned in the current usage of medicine and social science. The most objective
meaning is the purely statistical one, in which "abnormal" designates deviation from
the (statistical) "norm" of a specified biological or social population of organisms.
Whether an individual specimen, or bit of behavior, is abnormal in this sense is readily
ascertained by adequate sampling methods plus a more or less arbitrary choice of
cutting score (e.g., found in less than 1 in 100 cases). But for legal purposes this
purely statistical criterion does not suffice, because the kind and direction of statistical
deviation from population norms, as well as the amount of deviation which threatens
a protected social interest sufficiently to justify legal coercion, are questions not an-
swerable by statistics alone. Thus, anyone who has an IQ of 180, or possesses absolute
pitch, or is color-blind, is statistically abnormal but hardly rendered thereby a candidate
for incarceration, mandatory treatment, or deprivation of the usual rights and powers
of a "normal" individual. A second component in the concept of normality relies upon
our (usually inchoate or implicit) notions of biological health, of a kind of proper
functioning of the organism conceived as a teleological system of organs and capacities.
From a biological viewpoint, it is not inconsistent to assert that a sizable proportion-
conceivably a majority-of persons in a given population are abnormal or aberrant.
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of individual autonomy, however, renders us unable to express those
norms, however deeply they may be felt, in criminal proscriptions. We
could not bring ourselves to outlaw senility, or manic behavior, or
strange desires. Not only would this violate the common feeling that
one is not a criminal if he is powerless to avoid the crime, but it might
also reach conduct that most of us feel we have a right to engage in.
When a man squanders his savings in a hypomanic episode, we may
say, because of our own beliefs, that he is "crazy," but we will not say
that only reasonable purchases are allowed on pain of criminal punish-
ment. We are not yet willing to legislate directly the Calvinist ideal.
What we are not willing to legislate, however, we have been
willing to practice through the commitment process. That process
has been used to reach two classes of persons, those who are mentally
ill and dangerous to themselves or others ' and those who are mentally
ill and in need of care, custody or treatment.'3 While those terms seem
reasonably clear, on analysis that clarity evaporates.
Thus, if an epidemiologist found that 60% of the persons in a society were afflicted
with plague or avitaminosis, he would (quite correctly) reject an argument that
"Since most of them have it, they are okay, i.e., not pathological and not in need of
treatment." It is admittedly easier to defend this non-statistical, biological-fitness
approach in the domain of physical disease, but its application in the domain of be-
havior is fraught with difficulties. See W. ScHoIELD, PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE PUR-
CHASE OF FRIENDSHIP 12 (1964). Yet even here there is surely something to be said
for it in extreme cases, as, for example, the statistically "normal" frigidity of middle-
class Victorian women, which any modern sexologist would confidently consider a
biological maladaptation in need of repair, induced by "unhealthy" social learnings.
A third component invokes some sort of subjective norm, such as an aesthetic, religious,
ethical, or political ideal or rule. Finally, whether an a priori concept of "optimal
psychological adjustment" should be considered as yet a fourth meaning of normality,
or instead subsumed under one or more of the preceding, is a difficult question. In any
event, it is important to keep alert to hidden fallacies in legal and policy arguments
that rely upon the notion of abnormality or aberration, such as subtle transitions
from one of these criteria to another. It is especially tempting to the psychiatrist or
clinical psychologist, given his usual clinical orientation, to slip unconsciously from
the idea of "sickness," where treatment of a so-called "patient" is the model, to an
application that justifies at most a statistical or ideological or psychological-adjustment
usage of the word "norm." Probably the most pernicious error is committed by those
who classify as "sick" behavior that is aberrant in neither a statistical sense fzor in
terms of any defensible biological or medical criterion, but solely on the basis of
the clinician's personal ideology of mental health and interpersonal relationships.
Examples might be the current psychiatric stereotype of what a good mother or a
healthy family must be like, or the rejection as "perverse" of forms of sexual behavior
that are not biologically harmful, are found in many infra-human mammals and in
diverse human cultures, and have a high statistical frequency in our own society. See
generally F. BEACH, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR Ix ANIMALS AND MEN (1950); H. ELLIs,
STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX (1936); C. FORD & F. BEACH, PATTERNS OF
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (1951); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948); A. KINSEY, W. PoMERoY, C. MARTIN & P. GEDHARD,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953); W. MASTERS & W. JOHNSON,
Hum"r SEXUAL RESPONSE (1966); Ellis, What is "Normal" Sexual Behavior, 28
SEXOLOGY 364 (1962); S. FREUD, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in 7
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WoPas 123 (J. Strachey ed. 1962).
12 E.g., TENN. CODE: ANN. § 33-604(d) (1967).
13Id. For a discussion of standards applied in the various states, see AMERICAN
BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 17, 44-51 (1961).
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Mental Illness
One need only glance at the diagnostic manual of the American
Psychiatric Association 14 to learn what an elastic concept mental illness
is. It ranges from the massive functional inhibition characteristic of
one form of catatonic schizophrenia 1 5 to those seemingly slight aber-
rancies associated with an emotionally unstable personality,1" but which
are so close to conduct in which we all engage as to define the entire
continuum involved. Obviously, the definition of mental illness is left
largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of adjustment
that he employs. Usually the use of the phrase "mental illness"
effectively masks the actual norms being applied." And, because of
the unavoidably ambiguous generalities in which the American Psychi-
atric Association describes its diagnostic categories, the diagnostician
has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any
person he wishes, for whatever reason,'8 to put there.
All this suggests that the concept of mental illness must be limited
in the field of civil commitment to a necessary rather than a sufficient
condition for commitment. While the term has its uses, it is devoid
of that purposive content that a touchstone in the law ought to have.
Its breadth of meaning makes for such difficulty of analysis that it
answers no question that the law might wish to ask.'9
14 DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as DSM-II]. The first edition of this manual, published in 1952,
will be referred to as DSM-I.
15 DSM-II, 295.24, at 33.
16In such cases the individual reacts with excitability and ineffectiveness
when confronted by minor stress. His judgment may be undependable under
stress, and his relationship to other people is continuously fraught with fluctu-
ating emotional attitudes, because of strong and poorly controlled hostility,
guilt, and anxiety.
DSM-I, 000-x51, at 36. In DSM-II, this disorder is characterized as hysterical per-
sonality. DSM-II, 301.5, at 43.
1-7 "Normal and abnormal, one sometimes suspects, are terms which a particular
author employs with reference to his own position on that curve." A. KINSEY, W.
POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 199 (1948). See
also Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118, 125 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); W. SCHOFIELD, PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE PURCHASE OF
FRIENDSHIP 12-13 (1964); Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (1960).
138 The usual reason for variance in diagnosis is a variance in the theoretical
orientation of the diagnosticians.
19 We are not saying that mental illness does not exist or that the disease concept
should not be used in the field of "functional" behavior disorders. Compare T. SzAsz,
THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961); Albee, Models, Myths, and Manpower, 52
MENTAL HYGIENE 168 (1968) ; Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 113 (1960), with Ausubel, Personality Disorder is Disease, 16 Am. PSYCHOLo-
GIST 69 (1961) ; Meehl, Schizotaxia, Schizotypy, Schizophrenia, 17 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST
827 (1962); Meehl, Some Ruminations on the Validation of Clinical Procedures, 13
CAN. J. PSYCHOLOGY 102 (1959). The most objective and sophisticated methodological
analysis known to us of the general problem of taxonomy, types, and disease entities
in the domain of "non-organic" behavior disorders is Dahlstrom, Types and Per-
sonality Systematics, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN PERSONALITY THEORIES (R. Cattell ed.




The element of dangerousness to others has, at least in practice,
been similarly illusive. As Professors Goldstein and Katz have ob-
served, such a test, at a minimum, calls for a determination both of
what acts are dangerous and how probable it is that such acts will
occur.20 The first question suggests to a criminal lawyer the answer:
MEASUREMENT 382 (1957); M. LoRR, C. KLETT & D. MCNAIR, SYNDROMES OF PSY-
CHOSIS (1963); W. MAYER-GRoss, E. SLATER & M. ROTH, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 6
(2d ed. 1960); W. SARGANT & E. SLATER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL METHODS
OF TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY 4, 14, 305 (4th ed. 1963) ; Cattell, Taxonomic Prin-
ciples for Locating and Using Types, in FORMAL REPRESENTATION OF HUMAN JuDG-
MENT 99 (B. Kleinmuntz ed. 1968); Foulds, Psychotic Depression and Age, 106
J. MENTAL SCIENCE 1394 (1960); Kiloh & Garside, The Independence of Neurotic
Depression and Endogenous Depression, 109 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 451 (1963) ; McQuitty,
Pattern Analysis Illustrated in Classifying Patients and Normals, 14 EDUCATIONAL &
PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 598 (1954); McQuitty, Typal Analysis, 21 EDUCA-
TIONAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 677 (1961) ; Meehl, Detecting Latent Clin-
ical Taxa by Fallible Quantitative Indicators Lacking an Accepted Criterion, REP.
PR-65-2, RESEARCH LABORATORIES, DEP'T OF PSYCHIATRY, UNIV. OF MINN. (1965);
Meehl, Detecting Latent Clinical Taxa II: A Simplified Procedure, Some Additional
Hitmnax Cut Locators, a Single-Indicator Method, and Miscellaneous Theorems, REP.
PR-68-4, RESEARCH LABORATORIES, DEP'T OF PSYCHIATRY, UNIV. OF MINN. (1968);
Rao & Slater, Multivariate Analysis Applied to Differences Between Neurotic Groups,
2 BR. J. PSYCHOLOGY (STATISTICAL SECT.) 17 (1949); Wender, On Necessary and
Sufficient Conditions in Psychiatric Explanation, 16 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 41
(1967); Wittenborn, Symptom Patterns in a Group of Mental Hospital Patients, 15
J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 290 (1951). See generally EXPLORATIONS IN TYPING
PSYCHOTICS (M. Lorr ed. 1966) with its extensive bibliography. For a beautiful
methodological analysis of the relation between specific etiology and other quantitative
contributors-still very much worth reading in spite of the author's later repudiation
of his substantive thesis-see S. FREuD, On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular
Syndrome from Neurasthenia Under the Description "Anxiety Neurosis," and A Reply
to Criticisms of My Paper oft Anxiety Neurosis, in 3 CoM-PLET PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS
90, 123 (J. Strachey ed. 1962).
Even a nodding acquaintance with these works should suffice to convince any
scholar that the complexities are enormous, and that writers who find easy solutions
to the disease-entity problem (e.g., with a few cliches about "pigeonholing" and "the
unique individual") are not even beginning to grapple with it. A fair statement of
the present situation in psychiatry and clinical psychology with regard to "disease
entities" would be that nobody knows whether or not such entities exist outside the
domain of the "organic" psychoses associated with demonstrable damage to the brain
by trauma, toxins, infections, vascular disorder, senile changes, etc. The conceptual
and statistical problems involved are difficult, recondite, and highly technical. We can
only caution our law-trained readers against being "taken in" by plausible, quick and
easy verbal resolutions of the issue, which are all too common among psychologists
and psychiatrists. The most difficult class is the major functional disorders (e.g.,
schizophrenia, manic-depression) where hereditary factors appear to play an important
causal role, but where the concept "disease" does not have quite its usual medical
meaning. We do not think that the moral, policy and legal questions before us hinge
upon the resolution of these empirical issues. The clinical status of a psychologically
aberrated individual (e.g., "Can he think rationally about his condition?"), his prog-
nosis (with and without hospitalization and treatment), and his probability of socially
dangerous or intolerable conduct if left in the community are the relevant considera-
tions. Given a particular quantitative balance among these three behavioral factors,
what does it matter whether the behavior-syndrome is truly "taxonomic", and whether
the aberration, taxonomic or not, is mainly attributable to germs, genes, toxins, or
social learning experiences? It is, we submit, a mistake to rest the cases for and
against civil commitment upon the slippery semantics of the term "disease," or upon the
unsettled empirical questions concerning the etiology of mental disorder, as does Szasz.
20 Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on
the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted By Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L. J. 225,
235 (1960). See Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 U. VA. L. RFv. 1134,
1141-43 (1967).
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crimes involving a serious risk of physical or psychical harm to
another. Murder, arson and rape are the obvious examples. Even
in criminal law, however, the notion of dangerousness can be much
broader. If one believes that acts that have adverse effects on social
interests are dangerous, and if one accepts as a generality that the
criminal law is devoted to such acts, any crime can be considered dan-
gerous. For example, speeding in a motor vehicle, although tradi-
tionally regarded as a minor crime, bears great risk to life and property,
and thus may be viewed as a dangerous act. Dangerousness can bear
an even more extensive definition as well. An act may be considered
dangerous if it is offensive or disquieting to others. Thus, the man
who walks the street repeating, in a loud monotone, "fuck, fuck,
fuck," is going to wound many sensibilities even if he does not
violate the criminal law. Other examples would be the man, found
in most cities, striding about town lecturing at the top of his lungs,
or the similar character in San Francisco who spends his time shadow
boxing in public. If such people are dangerous, it is not because they
threaten physical harm but because we are made uncomfortable when
we see aberrancies. And, of course, if dangerousness is so defined, it
is at least as broad a concept as mental illness. The cases are un-
fortunately silent about what meaning the concept of danger bears in
the commitment process.2 '
Assuming that dangerousness can be defined, the problem of
predictability still remains. For the man who can find sexual release
only in setting fires, one may confidently predict that dangerous
acts will occur. For the typical mentally aberrant individual, though,
the matter of prediction is not susceptible of answer. However nervous
a full-blown paranoiac may make us, there are no actuarial data
indicating that he is more likely to commit a crime than any normal
person. Should he engage in criminal activity, his paranoia would
almost certainly be part of the etiology. But on a predictive basis we
have, as yet, nothing substantial to rely on.
2 But see United States v. Charnizon, 232 A.2d 586 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967), where
the probability of the issuance of checks drawn on insufficient funds was found to render
the defendant "dangerous."
2 2 While there is an inclination to equate mental illness and dangerousness, "the
fact is that the great majority of hospitalized mental patients are too passive, too
silent, too fearful, too withdrawn" to be dangerous. Statement of Albert Deutsch,
Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomn. of Consti-
tutioial Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings]. See also THE CmICIIc EvALuATIoIN OF THE
DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (J. Rappeport ed. 1967) ; Statement of Thomas
Szasz, 1961 Hearings 270; Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife
that Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRiAL, Feb./Mar. 1968 at 29; Giovannoni & Gurel, Socially
Disruptive Behavior of Ex-Mental Patients, 17 ARcH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 146 (1967) ;
Rappeport & Lassen, The Dangerousness of Female Patients: A Comparison of the
Arrest Rate of Discharged Psychiatric Patients and the General Population, 123 Am.
J. PSYcHiATRY 413 (1966) ; Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted
by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEx. L. REV. 849, 855-7 (1960).
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Even if such information were available, it is improbable that it
would indicate that the likelihood of crime within a group of indi-
viduals with any particular psychosis would be any greater than that
to be expected in a normal community cross-section." Surely the
degree of probability would not be as high as that in certain classes
of convicted criminals after their release from prison or that in certain
classes of persons having particular sociological or psychological
characteristics.
Dangerousness to Self
The concept of "dangerousness to self" raises similar problems.
The initial thought suggested by the phrase is the risk of suicide. But
again it can be broadened to include physical or mental harm from an
inability to take care of one's self, loss of assets from foolish expendi-
tures, or even loss of social standing or reputation from behaving
peculiarly in the presence of others.2' Again, if read very broadly this
concept becomes synonymous with that of mental illness. And, of
course, reliable prediction is equally impossible.
In Need of Care, Custody, or Treatment
The notion of necessity of care or treatment provides no additional
limitation beyond those imposed by the concepts already discussed.
One who is diagnosably mentally ill is, almost by definition, in need of
care or treatment.23 Surely the diagnostician reaching the first conclu-
sion would reach the second as well. And, if a man is dangerous, then
presumably he is in need of custody. The problem, of course, lies
with the word "need." If it is defined strictly as, for example, "cannot
live without," then a real limitation on involuntary commitment is
created. In normal usage, however, it is usually equated with "de-
sirable," and the only boundary on loss of freedom is the value
structure of the expert witness.
It is difficult to identify the reasons that lie behind incarceration
of the mentally ill. Three seem to be paramount:
23 Of course, the probability of dangerous conduct would increase if the computa-
tion was made on the basis of a subclass comprised only of mentally ill individuals
who had engaged in dangerous behavior before. Even here, though, we have no solid
data upon which to rely.
24 E.g., Statement of Hugh J. McGee, 1961 Hearings 56. Another example of
danger to self can be found in a woman enmeshed in a masochistic marriage. Not only
may she suffer physical harm at the hands of her sadistic husband but her need for
such sadism and her consequent willingness to endure it may lead to more serious
psychical deterioration. See Snell, Rosenwald & Robey, The Wife Beater's Wife-A
Study of Family Interaction, 11 ARcn. GEN. PsYcHIATRY 107 (1964).
25That one needs treatment does not answer two other crucial questions: whether
there is any known effective treatment for the affliction and whether treatment will be
made available.
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(1) It is thought desirable to restrain those people who
may be dangerous;
(2) It is thought desirable to banish those who are a
nuisance to others;
(3) It is thought humanitarian to attempt to restore to
normality and productivity those who are not now normal and
productive.
Each of these goals has social appeal, but each also creates analytic
difficulty.
As already mentioned, in order to understand the concept of
danger one must determine what acts are dangerous and how likely
is it that they will occur. There is a ready inclination to believe that
experts in the behavioral sciences will be able to identify those members
of society who will kill, rape, or burn. The fact is, however, that such
identification cannot presently be accomplished. First, our growing
insistence on privacy will, in all but a few cases, deny the expert access
to the data necessary to the task of finding potential killers. Second,
and of much greater importance, even if the data were available it is
unlikely that a test could be devised that would be precise enough to
identify only those individuals who are dangerous. Since serious
criminal conduct has a low incidence in society, and since any test must
be applied to a very large group of people, the necessary result is that
in order to isolate those who will kill it is also necessary to incarcerate
many who will not. Assume that one person out of a thousand will
kill. Assume also that an exceptionally accurate test is created which
differentiates with ninety-five per cent effectiveness those who will kill
from those who will not. If 100,000 people were tested, out of the
100 who would kill 95 would be isolated. Unfortunately, out of the
99,900 who would not kill, 4,995 people would also be isolated as
potential killers. 6 In these circumstances, it is clear that we could
not justify incarcerating all 5,090 people. If, in the criminal law, it is
better that ten guilty men go free than that one innocent man suffer, how
can we say in the civil commitment area that it is better that fifty-four
harmless people be incarcerated lest one dangerous man be free?
The fact is that without any attempt at justification we have
been willing to do just this to one disadvantaged class, the mentally
ill. This practice must rest on the common supposition that mental
illness makes a man more likely to commit a crime. While there may
be some truth in this, there is much more error. Any phrase that en-
26 See Meehl & Rosen, Antecedent Probability and the Efflcienwy of Psychometric
Signs, Patterns, or Cutting Scores, 52 PsycHoloaIcAL. BULL. 194 (1955); Rosen,
Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some Limitatiots in the Prediction of
Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSULTING PsYcHoLoGY 397 (1954).
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compasses as many diverse concepts as does the term "mental illness"
is necessarily imprecise. While the fact of paranoid personality might
be of significance in determining a heightened probability of killing,
the fact of hebephrenic schizophrenia probably would not. Yet both
fit under the umbrella of mental illness.
Even worse, we have been making assessments of potential danger
on the basis of nothing as precise as the psychometric test hypothesized.
Were we to ignore the fact that no definition of dangerous acts has
been agreed upon, our standards of prediction have still been horribly
imprecise. On the armchair assumption that paranoids are dangerous,
we have tended to play safe and incarcerate them all. Assume that the
incidence of killing among paranoids is five times as great as among
the normal population. If we use paranoia as a basis for incarceration
we would commit 199 non-killers in order to protect ourselves from
one killer 2 7  It is simply impossible to justify any commitment scheme
so premised. And the fact that assessments of dangerousness are
often made clinically by a psychiatrist, rather than psychometrically and
statistically, adds little if anything to their accuracy.2s
We do not mean to suggest that dangerousness is not a proper
matter of legal concern. We do suggest, however, that limiting its
application to the mentally ill is both factually and philosophically un-
justifiable. As we have tried to demonstrate, the presence of mental
illness is of limited use in determining potentially dangerous indi-
viduals. Even when it is of evidentiary value, it serves to isolate too
many harmless people.2 What is of greatest concern, however, is that
the tools of prediction are used with only an isolated class of people.
We have alluded before to the fact that it is possible to identify, on
the basis of sociological data, groups of people wherein it is possible
to predict that fifty to eighty per cent will engage in criminal or
delinquent conduct. And, it is probable that more such classes could
be identified if we were willing to subject the whole population to the
various tests and clinical examinations that we now impose only on
those asserted to be mentally ill. Since it is perfectly obvious that
society would not consent to a wholesale invasion of privacy of this
27Even if we applied the psychometric test earlier hypothesized to a group of
paranoids, we would still isolate ten harmless individuals for every dangerous one.
28See note 4 mtpra.
29This is compounded by the natural inclination of institutional psychiatrists and
committing courts to protect themselves against possible censure by retaining patients
until any possibility of danger has passed. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d
943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). This conclusion is reinforced by a study to which Dr. Gutt-
macher alluded, 1961 Hearings 152, when he said that "people who were released
against hospital advice made about as good an adjustment rate as the people who were
released by the hospital." See also Lewin, Disposition, of the Irresponsible: Protec-
tion Following Commitment, 66 MIcir. L. REv. 721 (1968).
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sort and would not act on the data if they were available, we can
conceive of no satisfactory justification for this treatment of the
mentally ill.
One possible argument for different treatment can be made in
terms of the concept of responsibility.30 We demonstrate our belief in
individual responsibility by refusing to incarcerate save for failure to
make a responsible decision. Thus, we do not incarcerate a group,
eighty per cent of whom will engage in criminal conduct, until those
eighty per cent have demonstrated their lack of responsibility-and even
then, the rest of the group remains free. The mentally diseased, so the
argument would run, may be viewed prospectively rather than retro-
spectively because for them responsibility is an illusory concept. We
do not promote responsibility by allowing the dangerous act to occur
since, when it does, we will not treat the actor as responsible. One
way of responding to this is to observe that criminal responsibility and
mental illness are not synonymous, and that if incarceration is to be
justified on the basis of irresponsibility, only those mentally ill who
will probably, as a matter of prediction, commit a crime for which they
will not be held responsible should be committed."' A more funda-
mental response is to inquire whether susceptibility to criminal punish-
ment is reasonably related to any social purpose. Granted that there
is a gain in social awareness of individual responsibility by not in-
carcerating the responsible in advance of their crime, it does not
necessarily follow that it is sufficiently great to warrant the markedly
different treatment of the responsible and the irresponsible.
The other possible justification for the existing differential is that
the mentally diseased are amenable to treatment. We shall explore the
ramifications of this at a later point. It is sufficient now to observe
that there is no reason to believe that the mentally well, but statistically
dangerous, individual is any less amenable to treatment, though that
treatment would undoubtedly take a different form.
Another basis probably underlying our commitment laws is the
notion that it is necessary to segregate the unduly burdensome and the
social nuisance. Two cases typify this situation. The first is the
senile patient whose family asserts inability to provide suitable care.
At this juncture, assuming that the family could put the person on the
street where he would be unable to fend for himself, society must act to
30 See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1288, 1290 (1966); Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 822, 827 (1967).
3' It would be even more difficult to predict irresponsibility than it is to predict
dangerous conduct. In addition, it is unlikely that the irresponsible will represent a
high percentage of the mentally ill. See Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of
M'Naghten, 51 MINx. L. R1v. 789 (1967).
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avoid the unpleasantness associated with public disregard of helpless-
ness. This caretaking function cannot be avoided. Its performance,
however, is a demonstration of the psychological truth that we can bear
that which is kept from our attention. Most of us profess to believe
that there is an individual moral duty to take care of a senile parent,
a paranoid wife, or a disturbed child. Most of us also resent the
bother such care creates. By allowing society to perform this duty,
masked in medical terminology, but frequently amounting in fact to
what one court has described as "warehousing," 32 we can avoid facing
painful issues.
The second case is the one in which the mentally ill individual
is simply a nuisance, as when he insists on sharing his paranoid de-
lusions or hallucinations with us. For reasons that are unclear, most
of us are extremely uncomfortable in the presence of an aberrant indi-
vidual, whether or not we owe him any duty, and whether or not he is
in fact a danger to us in any defensible use of that concept. Our
comfort, in short, depends on his banishment, and yet that comfort is
equally dependent on a repression of any consciousness of the reason
for his banishment. It is possible, of course, to put this in utilitarian
terms. Given our disquietude, is not the utility of confinement
greater than the utility of liberty? Perhaps so, but the assertions
either that we will act most reasonably if we repress thinking about
why we are acting or, worse yet, that our legislators will bear this
knowledge for us in order to preserve our psychic ease make us even
more uncomfortable than the thought that we may have to look mental
aberrance in the eye.
Again, we do not wish to suggest that either burden or bother is
an inappropriate consideration in the commitment process. What we
do want to make clear is that when it is a consideration it ought to be
advertently so. Only in that way can intelligent decisions about care,
custody, and treatment be made.
The final probable basis for civil commitment has both humani-
tarian and utilitarian overtones. When faced with an obviously aber-
rant person, we know, or we think we know, that he would be "hap-
pier" if he were as we are. We believe that no one would want to be a
misfit in society. From the very best of motives, then, we wish to
fix him. It is difficult to deal with this feeling since it rests on the
unverifiable assumption that the aberrant person, if he saw himself as
we see him, would choose to be different than he is. But since he
cannot be as we, and we cannot be as he, there is simply no way to
judge the predicate for the assertion.
32 Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Our libertarian views usually lead us to assert that treatment can-
not be forced on anyone unless the alternative is very great social harm.
Thus while we will require smallpox vaccinations 1 3 and the segregation
of contagious tuberculars, we will not ordinarily require bed rest for
the common cold, or a coronary, or even require a pregnant woman to
eat in accordance with a medically approved diet. Requiring treatment
whenever it seemed medically sound to do so would have utilitarian
virtues. Presumably, if death or serious incapacitation could thereby
be avoided society would have less worry about unsupported families,
motherless children, or individuals no longer able to support themselves.
Similarly, if the reasoning were pursued, we could insure that the
exceptionally able, such as concert violinists, distinguished scholars,
and inspiring leaders would continue to benefit society. Nonetheless,
only rarely does society require such treatment. 4 Not only does it
offend common notions of bodily integrity and individual autonomy,
but it also raises those issues of value judgment which, if not insoluble,
are at least discomforting. For example, is the treatment and cure of
the mentally ill individual of more benefit to society than the liberty
of which he is deprived and the principle (lost, or tarnished) that no
one should assert the right to control another's beliefs and responses
absent compelling social danger?
The reason traditionally assigned for forcing treatment on the
mentally ill while making it voluntary for other afflicted persons is that
the mentally ill are incapable of making a rational judgment whether
they need or desire such help. 5 As with every similar statement, this
depends on what kind of mental illness is present. It is likely that a
pederast understands that society views him as sick, that certain kinds
of psychiatric treatment may "cure" him, and that such treatment is
available in certain mental institutions. It is also not unlikely that he
will, in these circumstances, decide to forego treatment, at least if such
treatment requires incarceration. To say that the pederast lacks in-
sight into his condition and therefore is unable to intelligently decide
whether or not to seek treatment is to hide our real judgment that he
ought to be fixed, like it or not. 6 It is true that some mentally ill
33 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905): "Upon the principle of
self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against
an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members."
34 See generally, Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 293
(1966).
35 See generally Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty and the Law, 13 KAN.
L. REv. 59 (1964) ; Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts, 76 YALE L. J. 1160,
1168-1174 (1967) ; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Pro-
cedures, 79 HAgv. L. REv. 1288, 1295-98 (1966).
36The circularity of argument is obvious when the refusal to accept treatment is
used as evidence of incompetence to decide, which in turn justifies compulsion. It is
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people may be unable to comprehend a diagnosis and, in these instances,
forced treatment may be more appropriate. But this group is a small
proportion of the total committable population. Most understand what
the clinician is saying though they often disagree3 7 with his view.
We have tried to show that the common justifications for the
commitment process rest on premises that are either false or too broad
to support present practices. This obviously raises the question of
alternatives. Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested in another context
that the definition of mental illness ought to be tailored to the specific
social purpose to be furthered in the context in question.' That is
what we propose here.
Returning to the first of our considerations supporting commit-
ment, we suggest that before a man can be committed as dangerous it
must be shown that the probabilities are very great that he will commit
a dangerous act. Just how great the probabilities need be will depend
on two things: how serious the probable dangerous act is and how
likely it is that the mental condition can be changed by treatment. A
series of hypotheticals will indicate how we believe this calculus ought
to be applied.
Case 1: A man with classic paranoia exhibits in clinical
interview a fixed belief that his wife is attempting to poison
him. He calmly states that on release he will be forced to
kill her in self defense. The experts agree that his condition
is untreatable. Assume that statistical data indicate an eighty
per cent probability that homicide will occur. If society will
accept as a general rule of commitment, whether or not
mental illness is present, that an eighty per cent probability
of homicide is sufficient to incarcerate, then this man may be
incarcerated. In order to do this, of course, we must be
willing to lock up twenty people out of 100 who will not
commit homicide.
Case 2: Assume the same condition with only a forty
per cent probability of homicide.3 9 We do not know whether,
also present, however, in more refined formulations suggesting that mental illness
diminishes liberty and that "mental health treatment should be required when the
increase in liberty resulting from treatment outweighs the limitations necessary for
the therapeutic process." Comment, Liberty and Required Mental Health Treatment,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 1067 (1966). The circularity is buried even deeper when incom-
petence to decide is premised on a psychiatric judgment that while the proposed patient
cognitively appreciates the nature of the decision, his emotional response or affect is
inappropriate.3 7 See, e.g., M. TWAIN, THE MyvsT~mous STRANGER passim (1916).
38 Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea-Clues to the Problems of
Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in, the Death Cell, 73 YALE L.J. 425 (1964).3 9 The case becomes even more interesting when the condition is usually compen-
sated, thus making the individual a functioning member of society, but can on rare
occasions become briefly decompensated with possibly disastrous results. Consider the
case of the man who over a period of 15 years had two episodes of catatonic excitement
in which he became violently assaultive. Each occurrence came without warning.
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if the condition is untreatable, commitment is justified in
these circumstances. If lifetime commitment is required
because the probabilities are constant, we doubt that the
justification would exist. Our own value structure would
not allow us to permanently incarcerate sixty harmless indi-
viduals in order to prevent forty homicides. On the other
hand, if incarceration for a year would reduce the proba-
bility to ten per cent, then perhaps it is justified. Similarly,
if treatment over the course of two or three years would
substantially reduce the probability, then commitment might
be thought proper.
Case 3: A man who compulsively engages in acts of
indecent exposure has been diagnosed as having a sociopathic
personality disturbance. The probability is eighty per cent
that he will again expose himself. Even if this condition is
untreatable, we would be disinclined to commit.4  In our
view, this conduct is not sufficiently serious to warrant
extended confinement. For that reason, we would allow
confinement only if "cure" were relatively quick and certain.
The last case probably is more properly one of nuisance than
of danger. The effects of such conduct are offensive and irritating
but it is unlikely that they include long-term physical or psychical
harm. That does not mean, however, that society has no interest in
protecting its members from such upset. Again, the question is one
of alternatives. Much nuisance behavior is subject to the control
of the criminal law or of less formal social restraints. In mental in-
stitutions patients learn that certain behavior or the recounting of de-
lusions or hallucinations will be met with disapproval." Accordingly,
they refrain from such behavior or conversation. There is no reason
to believe that societal disapproval in the form of criminal proscriptions
or of less formal sanctions will be less effective as a deterrent.' And,
from our standpoint, the liberty of many mentally ill individuals is
worth far more than the avoidance of minor nuisances in society.
Case 4: A person afflicted with schizophrenia walks
about town making wild gestures and talking incessantly.
Those who view him are uncomfortable but not endangered.
We doubt that commitment is appropriate even though it
would promote the psychic ease of many people. Arguably
4 0 It should be pointed out, however, that such conduct would most probably violate
the criminal law, so that criminal prosecution and incarceration might be in order,
even though civil commitment would be improper.
4 1 See E. GOFFmAx, ASYLUMS (1961).
42 For example, a bus driver in Minneapolis began to annoy passengers by in-
flicting his paranoid ideas on them in conversation. He was advised by his employer
that if he continued to do this, he would lose his employment. The offensive conduct
stopped and the driver continued to work for many more years.
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we would all be happier if our favorite bogey man, whether
James Hoffa, Rap Brown, Mario Savio, or some other, were
incarcerated. Most of us would be outraged if any of these
men were committed on such a theory. If we cannot justify
such a commitment in these cases, we doubt that it is any
more justifiable when social anxiety is a consequence of seeing
mentally ill individuals. While it might be proper to commit
if speedy cure were possible, such cures are, as a matter of
fact, unavailable. Moreover, we have some difficulty dis-
tinguishing the prevention of psychic upset based on cure of
the mentally ill and prevention based on neutralizing other
upsetting behavior."
The next justification of commitment is more solid, though it too
presents the question of the necessity of utilizing less burdensome
alternatives. This is the rationale of care for the person who is unable
to care for himself and who has no one else to provide care for him.
As we suggested earlier, such care must be provided if we are unwilling
to allow people to die in the streets.
Case 5: An elderly woman with cerebro-vascular disease
and accompanying cerebral impairment has the tendency to
leave her home, to become lost, and then to wander help-
lessly about until someone aids her.44 At other times she is
perfectly able to go shopping or visit friends. She has
no relatives who will care for her in the sense that they will
prevent her from wandering or will find her when she has
become lost. In some ways, this is another case of a public
nuisance and it may well be that it is impossible to find a
justification for incarcerating this woman. On the other
hand, to allow this woman to die from exposure on one of
her forays is as disquieting as the loss of her freedom. Since
her condition is untreatable, provision of treatment offers no
justification for confinement. It might be justifiable to
exercise some supervision over her, but surely that justifica-
43 The most famous case of incarceration to relieve psychic anxiety is the segre-
gation of the Japanese in World War II. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) ;
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). This episode, however, has never
been cited as one that had favorable precedential value. See Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
A statute in the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 24-301(d) (1961), providing
for mandatory commitment after acquittal by reason of insanity was passed in part
to add to "the public's peace of mind." Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 717 (1962),
quoting S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955); H.R. REP. No. 892, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955). In the case of Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1968), the mandatory commitment provision was attacked as failing to provide equal
protection of the laws. Judge Bazelon agreed, but instead of holding the entire pro-
vision invalid, the court merely read the procedural safeguards of the civil commitment
statute into subsection (d). See Comment, Commitment Following Acquittal by
Reason of Insanity and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 924
(1968). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
4 4 See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1968]
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tion will not support total incarceration. In these circum-
stances, we believe that if the state wishes to intervene it
must do so in some way that does not result in a total loss
of freedom." The desire to help ought not to take the form
of simple jailing.
Case 6: A schizophrenic woman is causing such an
upset in her family that her husband petitions for commit-
ment. It is clear that the presence of this woman in the
family is having an adverse effect on the children. Her
husband is simply unwilling to allow the situation to con-
tinue. The alternatives here are all unpleasant to con-
template. If the husband gets a divorce and custody, he may
accomplish his end. But the social opprobrium attaching to
that solution makes it unlikely. The question, then, is
whether the state should provide a socially acceptable alterna-
tive. If that alternative is her loss of freedom, we find it
hard to justify. Assuming that the condition is untreatable,
that the woman is not dangerous, and that her real sin is her
capacity to disrupt, it is almost incomprehensible that she
should be subject to a substantial period of incarceration.
Yet that is what it has meant. Presumably, in order to
isolate the woman from her family, it is necessary to trans-
port her to a location where she will no longer bother her
family. Then, if she is able to support herself she could
have complete freedom. If she is not able, the state will
have to provide care. That care, of course, need not involve
a total deprivation of freedom.4
The final justification for commitment-the need to treat-is in
many ways the most difficult to deal with. As we have said before,
society has not traditionally required treatment of treatable diseases
even though most people would agree that it was "crazy" for the
diseased person not to seek treatment." The problem has been
complicated by the fact that religious beliefs against certain forms of
treatment often are present" and by the fact that most cases of
stubborn refusal to accept treatment never come into public view.49
There is, however, a competing analogy that suggests that mandatory
treatment may sometimes be appropriate.
4 Id. See also AssocIATioN OF THE BAR OF THE CITy OF NEW YORK, MENTAL
ILLNESS AND DUE PRocEss 43 (1962).
46 If nothing short of total confinement can keep the woman away from her family,
we may have to temporarily deprive her of all freedom. If this occurs frequently
enough, deterrence may be effected. If that, too, fails, then long term confinement may
be necessary, barbaric as that may seem. Obviously, the disruption ought to be very
great before this last alternative is embraced.
47 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
48E.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967).
49 See In Memory of Mr. Jstice Jackson, 349 U.S. xxvii, xxix (1955).
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Without going into unnecessary detail, we think it can be said
that one of the reasons society requires compulsory education is that
it believes a certain minimum amount of socialization is necessary for
everyone lest they be an economic burden or a personal nuisance."
That principle can also be used to support mandatory psychiatric re-
wiring if the individual to be refurbished is in fact a burden or
nuisance and can be fixed. The difficulty, of course, lies in the extent
to which the principle can be carried. To take a mild example outside
the field of mental disease, assume an unemployable individual who is
unable to support his large and growing family. Could society in-
carcerate him until he had satisfactorily acquired an employable skill? "'
In the context of mental disease, then, can society demand that an
individual obtain an employable psyche?
Case 7: An individual has been suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia for several years without remission and has
lost his job because of his behavior. He is divorced, but he
is able to support himself from prior savings. He is not
dangerous, and if he is committed it is unlikely that he will
be cured since the recovery rates from such long-term
schizophrenia are very low.0 In addition, the availability
of treatment in a state mental institution is problematic. 
3
6o "A primary purpose of the educational system is to train school children in
good citizenship, patriotism and loyalty to the state and the nation as a means of pro-
tecting the public welfare." In re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 686, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165,
168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). See also State v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346
P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960).
51 Consider the comment of the Minnesota court in Leavitt v. City of Morris,
105 Minn. 170, 175, 117 N.W. 393, 395 (1908): "The state has the power to reclaim
submerged lands, which are a menace to the public health, and make them fruitful.
Has it not, also, the power to reclaim submerged men, overthrown by strong drink, and
help them to regain self-control ?" But see Golding, Ethical Issutes int Biological
Engineering, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 443 (1968).
6 See, e.g., Drasgow, A Criterion for Chronicity in Schizophrenia, 31 PsYcHI-
ATRIC Q. 454 (1957).
5 3 That a certain form of treatment is useful in one type of case, of course, does
not mean it is uniformly efficacious or even helpful with respect to all mental illnesses.
Thus, while milieu therapy, the provision of a structured environment, may be a posi-
tive benefit to a psyche that must be removed from existing pressures or stresses, it
may be useless or even harmful in other cases requiring other forms of treatment.
We applaud the humanitarian concern of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in recognizing a right to treatment in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451
(D.C. Cir. 1966), but we view that effort as misconceived. It suggests that if a
patient is receiving any treatment, the state may continue his commitment This can
only be so if the provision of treatment is itself a basis of commitment, a proposition
that we find horrifying in its implications. It also tends to direct attention to the
limited question of provision of treatment rather than to the more fundamental question
whether the state may incarcerate. Finally, by necessity it requires assessment of
adequacy of treatment, an issue that because the treating professionals are in dis-
agreement, the courts are ill-equipped to judge. See generally Commonwealth v.
Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959) ; Position Statement on the Adequacy of
Treatment, 123 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458 (1967) ; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Ill-
ness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967) ; Note, Due Process for
All-Cotstitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34
U. CHI. L. REv. 633 (1967) ; Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 U. VA. L.
REv. 1134 (1967).
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We doubt that he can justifiably be committed. If treatment
is an adequate basis for confinement, it surely ceases to be
so either when the illness is untreatable or when treatment is
in fact not given or given in grossly insufficient amounts.
No other basis for commitment being present, it is un-
justifiable.
Case 8: A distinguished law school professor, known for
a series of brilliant articles, is suffering from an involutional
depression. His scholarship has dried up, and, while he is
still able to teach, the spark is gone and his classes have be-
come extremely depressing. There is a chance, though prob-
ably not more than twenty-five per cent," that he will commit
suicide. He has been told that he would recover his old 6lan
if he were subjected to a series of electro-shock treatments
but this he has refused to do. In fact, in years past when he
was teaching a course in law and psychology, he stated that
if he ever became depressed he wanted it known that before
the onset of depression he explicitly rejected such treatment.
Should he be compelled to undergo treatment? The argu-
ments of social utility would suggest that he should. Yet we
are unable to dislodge the notion that potential added pro-
ductivity is not a license for tampering.
Case 9: A woman suffers from a severe psychotic de-
pression resulting in an ability to do little more than weep.
Again shock treatment is recommended with a reasonable
prospect of a rapid recovery. The woman rejects the sug-
gestion saying that nothing can make her a worthy member
of society. She is, she claims, beyond help or salvation. It
is possible to distinguish this from the preceding case on the
ground that her delusional thought processes prevent her
from recognizing the desirability of treatment. But any dis-
tinction based on a proposed patient's insight into her con-
dition will probably be administered on the assumption that
any time desirable treatment is refused, insight is necessarily
lacking. And that, of course, would destroy the distinction.
These cases suggest that the power to compel treatment is one
that rarely ought to be exercised. We are unable to construct a
rationale that will not as well justify remolding too many people to
match predominant ideas of the shape of the ideal psyche. We recog-
nize, of course, that we are exhibiting a parade of horrors. In this
instance, however, we believe such reference justified. The ease with
which one can be classified as less than mentally healthy, and the
difficulty in distinguishing degrees of sickness, make us doubt the
ability of anyone to judge when the line between minimum socialization
541 AFmEiCAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 543 (S. Arieti ed. 1959).
[Vol-l17:75
CIVIL COMMITMENT
and aesthetically pleasing acculturation has been passed. Regardless
of our views, however, it seems clear that if society chooses to continue
to exercise the power to compel treatment, it ought to do so with
constant awareness of the threat to autonomy thus posed.
Different considerations are present when commitment is not
based on the need to treat. If one is committed as dangerous, or as
a nuisance, or as unable to care for oneself, and treatment can cure
this condition, then it is easier to strike the balance between deprivation
of liberty and the right to refuse treatment in favor of compulsory
treatment. If told that this is the price of freedom, the patient may
accede; if he prefers confinement to treatment, perhaps the state ought
not to override his wishes. But at least in this situation the question
is ethically a close one.
The difficulty with present commitment procedures is that they
tend to justify all commitments in terms that are appropriate only to
some, and to prescribe forms of treatment that are necessary in only
some cases. Thus, while danger stemming from mental illness may
be a proper basis for commitment, it does not follow that all mentally
ill are dangerous, or that the standards of danger should be markedly
less rigid in cases of mental illness. Similarly, because mentally ill
people may be a nuisance and some means of preventing such nuisance
must be found, it does not follow that nuisance commitments ought to
involve the same restraints as commitments based upon potential
danger. Finally, because treatment is humanitarian when applied to
those confined for danger, nuisance, or care, does not in itself suggest
that treatment can be applied whenever administrators believe it proper
or humane to do so.
We recognize that many people will not agree with the manner in
which we have drawn the balance in individual cases. We hope that
few will disagree that the balance must be drawn. We suggest, there-
fore, that in each case of proposed commitment, the following questions
be asked:
I. What. social purpose will be served by commitment?
A. If protection from potential danger, what dan-
gerous acts are threatened? How likely are they to
occur? How long will the individual have to be con-
fined before time or treatment will eliminate or reduce
the danger so that he may be released? "
B. If protection from nuisance, how onerous is the
nuisance in fact? Ought that to justify loss of freedom?
65 See generally Dession, Deviation and Community Sanwtions, in PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW 1, 11 (P. Hoch & J. Zubin eds. 1955).
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If it should, how long will confinement last before time
or treatment will eliminate or reduce the risk of nuisance
so that release may occur?
C. If the need for care, is care in fact necessary?
If so, how long will confinement last before time or
treatment will eliminate the need for care so that release
may occur?
II. Can the social interest be served by means less
restrictive than total confinement?
III. Whatever standard is applied, is it one that can
comfortably be applied to all members of society, mentally ill
or healthy? "I
IV. If confinement is justified only because it is believed
that it will be of short term for treatment, is the illness in
fact treatable? If it is, will appropriate treatment in fact
be given?
If these questions are asked-and we view it as the duty of the attorney
for the potential patient to insure that they are-then more intelligent
commitment practices may follow.57
5 6 See Morris, Impediments to Peiml Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 627, 640 (1966).
57 The proposed statutory formulation that most nearly approaches ours is con-
tained in RoYAL CoMMISSION ON THE LAW RELATING TO MENTAL ILLNESS AND MENTAL
DariclENcY, 1954-1957, REPORT, CMD. No. 169, at 111 (1957) :
We consider that the use of special compulsory powers on grounds of the
patient's mental disorder is justifiable when:-
(a) there is reasonable certainty that the patient is suffering from a
pathological mental disorder and requires hospital or community
care; and
(b) suitable care cannot be provided without the use of compulsory
powers; and
(c) if the patient himself is unwilling to receive the form of care
which is considered necessary, there is at least a strong likelihood
that his unwillingness is due to a lack of appreciation of his own
condition deriving from the mental disorder itself; and
(d) there is also either
(i) good prospect of benefit to the patient from the treatment
proposed-an expectation that it will either cure or
alleviate his mental disorder or strengthen his ability to
regulate his social behaviour in spite of the underlying
disorder, or bring him substantial benefit in the form of
protection from neglect or exploitation by others; or
(ii) a strong need to protect others from anti-social be-
haviour by the patient.
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